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Introduction
Financial inclusion, broadly defined as the share of households and firms that use formal financial services, is increasingly recognized as crucial for development. Financial inclusion can have substantial effects on welfare and can contribute to the reduction of poverty 1 . In particular, financial inclusion allows individuals and firms to reduce the costs of making transactions and to move away from short-term decision making toward an inter-temporal allocation of resources. This encourages savings and improves incentives for productive investments. As argued by Allen et al (2012) , there is significant evidence supporting the positive effects of having a bank account on individuals' saving and investment behavior.
Although its importance is widely recognized -with a substantial amount of supporting literature 2 -, financial inclusion remains extremely low in a large number of Latin American countries. According to World Bank calculations for 2011 3 , the percentage of adults that
have an account at a formal financial institution was only 30 percent in Colombia, 42 percent in Chile and a dismal 14 percent in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Even in Brazil, the country with the highest ratio of financial inclusion in the region, the ratio only reached 56 percent.
For the region as a whole, the average was 30 percent, far below the average ratio in high income countries (89 percent) and even below the world average (46 percent). Most importantly Latin America lagged significantly relative to countries with similar real income per capita (henceforth, the region's comparators). Specifically, financial inclusion in Latin America's comparators reached an average of 49 percent; that is, on average, financial inclusion in the comparators group was over 60 percent higher than in Latin America. This gap was similar when comparing median values. The median value of financial inclusion in Latin America was 27.7 percent while that of its comparators equaled 45.5 percent.
This paper builds on existing research and new databases to address a fundamental question:
What are the relevant factors explaining the lower ratios of financial inclusion in Latin See Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) for an analysis of the effects of financial development on poverty rates. For the linkages between access to formal financial services and poverty see Dupas and Robinson (2009) and Brune et al. (2011) .
2 See for example Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Honohan (2008) for an analysis of the theoretical models that illustrate the role access to finance plays in the development process. And Levine (2005) and Beck (2009) The inclusion of a variety of country variables for understanding the Latin American financial inclusion gap builds up on the work of Rojas-Suarez (2007) , among others, and is based on the premise that financial intermediaries' decisions are significantly influenced by the economic and institutional environment where the financial system operates. For example, it is expected that countries with greater institutional weaknesses are those where challenges to improve financial inclusion could become more daunting. Financial institutions might not be willing to extend the provision of financial services to large segments of the population in societies where the respect for the rule of law, including enforcement of contracts, is highly deficient. As shown below, relative to their comparators, most Latin
American countries are not favorably placed regarding the quality of their institutions. This could, therefore, be a contributing factor explaining the region's financial inclusion gap.
Another example of country-specific variables that are potential candidates to understand the Latin American financial inclusion gap relates to the efficiency of the overall financial system. It is expected that in financial systems with large operational inefficiencies reflected, inter alia, in high administrative costs and/or a high degree of bank concentration, financial services might only be offered at very high costs--above those in a competitive system--which reduces usage of these services. 4 On average, banks' administrative costs are higher in Latin America than in its comparators. This paper will explore whether this difference serves to explain the financial inclusion gap.
Additional country-specific variables that could potentially explain the lower usage of financial services in Latin America relative to its comparators include macroeconomic fragilities, such as the region's high volatility of inflation, and socioeconomic variables, such as Latin America's high income inequality-the highest among regions of the world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some stylized facts that characterize financial inclusion in Latin America, highlighting differences with other country groups, especially a set of countries categorized as the region's comparators. Section 3 3 identifies and discusses key obstacles at the country level affecting financial inclusion.
Section 4 presents an econometric analysis aimed at answering two questions: (a) At the country level, which obstacles explain the lower levels of financial inclusion in Latin America relatively to comparators? and (b) at the individual level, does belonging to Latin America significantly affect individuals' probability of being financially included, controlling for demographic characteristics such as age, sex, education and income? Is there any Latin
American-specific effect of these individual characteristics? Section 5 concludes.
Financial Inclusion in Latin America: How does it compare with other country groups?
Until very recently, limited availability of data imposed a serious constraint on the empirical analysis of financial inclusion. 5 Over the past couple of years, however, important efforts have emerged to overcome this problem.
At the regional level, the Andean Development Corporation (CAF, 2010) surveyed households in 17 large Latin American cities to gauge information on key characteristics of financial inclusion affecting the adult population, including factors deterring the demand for financial services. 6 Selected questions on financial inclusion were also included in the CAF's 2011 survey, with plans to repeat the surveys in the years to come. 7 At the global level, a World Bank project, named the Global Findex database was designed to allow comparisons across country characteristics, individual characteristics, and over time. 8 The first round of the Findex database, covering the adult population (defined as 15 years of age and older) of 148 countries, was made public in 2011. While it is still too early to count with time series data (updates are scheduled for 2014 and 2017), the common methodology used in the country surveys allows sound cross-country and cross-individuals comparisons.
5 Indeed, most cross-country analyses were based on an indicator of financial inclusion constructed by Honohan (2007) , based on multiple sources. See, for example, Rojas-Suarez (2010 Table 1 to 3 present two indicators of financial inclusion taken from the Global Findex database: the percentage of adults that have an account at a formal financial institution, and the percentage of adults that have deposited savings at a financial institution in the past year.
The former indicator provides a stock measurement while the latter is a flow measurement that is indicative of current activity by individuals in the usage of at least one category of financial services: savings. The indicators are presented for Latin American countries and for country groupings by income levels according to the World Bank categories. Table 1 shows that, although with significant dispersion, no country in Latin America financially includes the large majority of its population. In the countries with the highest ratios, Brazil and Costa Rica, only half of the adult population has financial accounts.
Moreover, this ratio is extremely low (less than 25 percent) in Central American economies (excluding Costa Rica), Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. For this latter set of countries, the ratio of inclusion to formal financial services is similar to that of the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (24.1 percent) 9, 10 . An additional important result is derived from column 2: Although a country comparison shows that the intensity of usage of savings accounts (column 2) roughly corresponds to the penetration of financial inclusion (column 1) 11 , there are some clear exceptions. In Argentina, only 3.8 percent of the adult population has saved in a formal institution in 2010-11, the lowest number among the countries in our sample and out of line with the penetration indicator of column 1 (33 percent). This is indicative of a potential disintermediation process in Argentina; not a surprising result in the context of the ongoing economic and financial difficulties faced by this country. As discussed below, by affecting the demand for financial services, economic conditions play an important role as determinants of financial inclusion 12 .
9 See World Bank (2012) 10 Of course it is possible that important segments of the population have access to financial services provided in the informal sector. However, as mentioned in the introduction, this paper takes the view that there are important benefits in the provision of financial services through formal channels.
11 For example, Costa Rica, the country with the largest percentage of adult populations that have a financial account, is also the country with the largest percentage of adult populations that increased its savings in 2010-2011. Likewise, Nicaragua, displays one of the lowest ratio of financial inclusion in the region (14.2 percent) and a dismal percentage of the adult population that saved in 2010-11 (6.5 percent) . 12 It is important to note that the indicators used in this paper do not reveal the existing huge differences in financial inclusion between urban and rural populations. By and large, the percentage of urban populations being financially included is much larger than the corresponding percentage in rural areas (a comprehensive analysis on financial inclusion in major urban areas in Latin America is included in CAF (2011)). Explaining the differential behavior in the usage of financial services between urban and rural areas is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Latin America lags significantly relative to High Income countries in terms of the percentage of the adult population with an account in a formal institution; the Latin American figure is about one third of the corresponding number for high income economies. Moreover, Latin America lags significantly with respect to its comparators, and is only moderately higher than the rest of non-Latin American developing countries. This raises the issue about the particular features of Latin America that may explain the low levels of financial inclusion. 15 These issues will be dealt with in section 4.
The story for the flow indicator of financial inclusion (percentage of adult population who saved in the period 2010-11) is similar to, but much more dramatic than that of the stock variable. The percentage of the population who saved in Latin America is about one quarter of the corresponding percentage in high income countries. An additional indicator that is often used to complement the financial inclusion indicator is banking system penetration through channels like bank branches and ATMs. 16 These indicators are taken from the Financial Access Survey (FAS), a database constructed by the 15 Which are actually closer to many of the poorest countries in the world than to the region's comparators. 16 Ideally, the activities of the entire formal financial system would be accounted for rather than just the banking system. However, no such data exists for world-wide comparisons, thus this indicator provides useful, albeit limited additional information.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 17 and are presented in Table 3 . The indicators consider the number of bank branches and ATMs per 100,000 adults. The figures in Table 3 show a significant difference between high income countries and Latin American countries in terms of bank coverage through branches and ATMs. However, this gap is lower than that for the indicators of financial inclusion shown in Tables 1 and 2 .
For example the average number of branches per 100,000 adults in Latin America is 63 percent of the corresponding value in high income countries and above the value of the Latin American comparators.
However, an important caveat in assessing the importance of banks' financial penetration through branches and ATMS is that banks in a number of countries are using other channels for the delivery of financial services, mostly based on digital technology. For example, for
Brazilian financial institutions, the most important form of reaching rural areas is through non-bank correspondents; these are non-banking entities which provide banking services through digital connections with a bank. This model has become increasingly popular and has started to be applied in other Latin American countries such as Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Similarly, in other countries like Bolivia, the large expansion of microfinance activities is not necessarily based on the usage of branches or ATMs.
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Obstacles to Financial Inclusion in Latin America: CrossCountry Comparisons
At the country level, the vast literature 18 on financial inclusion has identified a number of constraints for financial inclusion, both on the supply and the demand sides. In this section, we follow the classification of factors affecting financial inclusion suggested by Rojas-Suarez (2007) and further explored by Rojas-Suarez and Gonzales (2010) and discuss simple correlations between financial inclusion and some of the most important identified constraints. Here and in Section 4, the variable of financial inclusion used is the percentage of the population that has at least one account at a formal financial institution. As explained above, this indicator is taken from the Global Findex Database for the year 2011.
Obstacles affecting financial inclusion can be classified into four categories. The first category relates to socio-economic constraints that limit both the supply of and the demand for financial services. The second deals with vulnerabilities in the macroeconomic environment that deters large segments of the population from using the services provided by the formal financial system. The third category focuses on institutional weaknesses, with emphasis on the quality of the governability of countries. Finally, the fourth category identifies characteristics in the operations of the formal financial system that impede the adequate provision of financial services. These operations respond both to the regulatory framework and to the specific features of the financial system (such as the competitive environment, business models, etc.). The discussion in this section provides insights on the behavior of these obstacles for the Latin American region relative to its comparators. An econometric investigation of these relationships will be undertaken in section 4. Alternatively, a country's degree of social development could be proxied by the value of its real GDP per capita. As shown in Figure 1b , the correlation between GDP per capita and financial inclusion is highly positive (0.83) and of the same order of magnitude as the correlation between social development and financial inclusion (0.83). As expected, the 20 The HDI has three components. The first relates to health, the second to education and the third to income. Income distribution is another socio-economic factor potentially affecting financial inclusion. Inequality can hinder financial reforms and financial development that enhance financial inclusion. The argument is that in very unequal economies, with a highly skewed distribution of income, wealth and political powers, powerful interests will likely block or manipulate reforms so as to capture the benefits and avoid the costs (Claessens and Perotti, 2005) . Behrman and Birdsall (2009) analyze the relationship between structural, high inequality -measured by schooling inequality-and an index of financial liberalization for a sample of 37 developing and developed countries. They conclude that in a highly unequal setting, powerful interests are more likely to dominate politics, pushing for financial policies that protect privileges rather than foster competition and growth.
Some authors, however, argue that there is some evidence suggesting that improved household financial inclusion may lead to lower income inequality (see Honohan 2007) .
Thus, there is the potential for reverse causality in the relationship between these two variables.
21 This result is not surprising since GDP per capita is one of the components of the HDI and, as Pritchett (2010) has noted the cross-country variability of the HDI is increasingly driven by GDP per capita. wealth. Deposits' freeze, interest rate ceilings, forced conversion of foreign-currency denominated deposits into local currency-denominated deposits using undervalued exchange rates, and hyperinflation that destroyed the value of savings in the financial system were among the causes. 22
High inflation volatility and real interest rates perhaps best capture the adverse effect of macro instability on the demand for financial services. The importance of institutional quality in the provision of financial services has been discussed extensively in the literature. 24 The institutional environment in which financial entities operate plays a central role in the provision of financial services.
To measure institutional quality, this paper uses the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 25 Previous studies 26 have demonstrated that the financial system will develop more fully in countries with observance of the law, political stability, fair and efficient enforcement of the rule of law and respect for creditors' and debtors' rights. When contracts between creditors and debtors are observed, depositors have incentives to entrust their savings to banks and other financial institutions. Also, financial firms have incentives to lend at better rates and longer terms to enterprises, since they can seize collaterals when default happens and are compensated according to pre-established rules in bankruptcy. In a recent paper, Allan et al (2012) show that two measures of creditors' rights-the "legal right index" from the World 24 An analysis of the effect of institutional quality on access to bank services is found in Beck et al. (2003) . 25 www.govindicators.org 26 See for example, Claessens and Leaven (2003) and Demetriades and Andrianova (2004) . 
d. Financial Sector Inefficiencies and Inadequacies
Based on Rojas-Suarez (2007) , in this category we include obstacles to financial inclusion encountered by individuals and firms that can be attributed to characteristics of the financial system, including financial entities' methods and practices in conducting their operations.
Operational inefficiencies reflected, for example, in high administrative costs and/or a high degree of concentration can result in important constraints for financial inclusion. 28 Financial system's inefficiencies tend to restrict the availability of financial products and to increase the price of accessing them. High costs of opening and maintaining an account in a financial institution (above the costs in more efficient systems) and high minimum balances requirements are byproducts of these inefficiencies. 29 The ratio of overhead (administrative) costs to total assets is commonly used as an indicator of banks' operational inefficiency. High ratios tend to increase the fixed costs of extending loans and maintaining accounts as well as lowering interest payments on savings and other deposits, therefore restricting financial inclusion. 28 A number of financial system inefficiencies can in turn, be associated with inadequate policies and regulations 29 Beck et al (2006) and Allen et al (2012) use survey data to the analyze costs of opening and maintaining bank accounts. However, the data in Beck et al cover only 62 countries and that in Allen et al (2012) is not publicly available.
The figure shows results similar to those in previous graphs in the sense that high income countries display the lowest ratios of operational inefficiency (lower overhead costs). 30 Among Latin American countries, Paraguay stands out for having the highest ratios of bank operational inefficiency and one of the lowest values of the indicator of financial inclusion in the region. While Chile displays ratios similar to those in high income countries, the average and the median Latin American country have ratios of operational inefficiency much higher than the average comparator country. Indeed, the median value for Latin America (4.8 percent) is over 50 percent higher than the median value for comparator countries (2.7 percent).
Banking concentration can also be considered a measure of financial inefficiency to the extent that it might lead to oligopolistic behavior. In addition to driving up the costs of providing financial services, high levels of banking concentration might also inhibit lending to individuals and SMEs if concentration is associated with a lack of competitive incentives to assess the quality of borrowers with relative riskier characteristics. However, recent studies have found that highly concentrated banking systems become an obstacle to financial inclusion mostly in those countries with weak institutions and strong restrictions on the range of permissible banking activities. 31 At places where contract enforcement is weaker, 30 The data is the average for 2006-2010 to smooth out the effects of the global financial crisis. 31 See, for example, Claessens (2005) . Figure 6b plots financial inclusion and bank concentration for two groups of countries. For illustrative purposes we have arbitrarily defined "low weak-law countries" as the ones whose weak law levels are below the average of the sample, and "high-weak law countries" as the ones whose weak law levels are above the average. As expected, almost all high income countries fall into the first category. However, the correlation coefficient between bank concentration and financial inclusion for the sample of "low weak-law countries" is not significant and, therefore, we cannot determine statistically that there is a relationship between those variables. In contrast, in the sample of "high weak-law countries" we find a significant and negative correlation between bank concentration and institutional quality of -0.3. In fact, most Latin American countries are within this group, suggesting that bank 32 Defined as the percentage of total system assets held by the three largest banks. respectively) do no differ significantly from those of its comparators (58.5 and 58.7 respectively).
We therefore hypothesize that in countries with strong institutions, such as the high income countries, the net adverse effect of high bank concentration on financial inclusion is much lower (and perhaps even insignificant) than in countries with weak institutions. This issue will be discussed further in the next section when we formally analyze the overall effects of bank concentration.
Explaining Low Financial Inclusion in Latin America: An Econometric Analysis
This section conducts an econometric analysis to understand the relatively low degree of Also, we evaluate whether there is any Latin American-specific effect of these individual characteristics. While we acknowledge that there are additional individual characteristics that might be relevant in explaining financial inclusion, our analysis is limited to these four characteristics because of data availability. The Latin America dummy is taken here to reflect the region's financial inclusion gap relative to comparators. As discussed above, comparator countries are defined as those with a similar real income per capita as Latin America (see Annex I).
Since there is no time series data available for the dependent variable,
_
Fin Inclusion , we are restricted to using a cross-section data set in the estimation of equation (1). Data for the dependent variable corresponds to 2011. For the explanatory variables, we use the latest available data.
The discussion in Section 3 provided the basis for identifying the variables to conduct the econometric exercise. However, the presence of multicollinearity prevented the simultaneous inclusion of all controls discussed in section 3. For example, the degree of social development and the quality of institutions (reflected by the variable Weak_Law) were highly correlated (a correlation coefficient of 0.75). We also considered an additional set of variables that could be classified within any of the four categories of obstacles. Annex III presents the entire list of variables considered and their sources. In some cases, data availability precluded the inclusion of some variables; in others multicollinearity was the constraint.
The explanatory variables included in the regressions presented in Table 5 In addition to these obstacles to financial inclusion, we also considered real GDP per capita as a control in the empirical analysis. This is consistent with the discussion in section 3. Real GDP per capita is measured in logs and defined as follows: The variables Log_GDP_per_capita and Weak_Law are highly correlated. 34 Thus, to avoid multicollinearity, the analysis that follows presents two sets of regressions. In the first one we control for the effects of institutional quality and in the second one for the effect of real income per capita.
a.2. Econometric strategy
As a first step we estimate a simple OLS regression including the dummy for Latin America and a dummy for countries outside comparators (see table 5 column 1). The coefficient of the Latin America dummy reflects the difference between the average financial inclusion in Latin America and its comparators (18.1 percentage points in absolute terms). As mentioned before, we call this difference: the Latin American financial inclusion gap. Our purpose is to evaluate whether the incorporation of alternative obstacles to financial inclusion in the regression can help to understand this gap.
Before proceeding, however, we need to deal with possible endogeneity issues. The strict exogeneity of each obstacle included in the regression is a necessary condition to draw any conclusion about their effects on the gap. As mentioned in section 3, the literature shows evidence of a relationship between financial inclusion and one of the obstacles considered in the regression, Income_Inequality, which might be driven by reverse causation. This generates a potential problem of endogeneity of income inequality. We, therefore, test for potential endogeneity and evaluate the convenience of using instrumental variables estimation (IV) to deal with this problem. Annex IV verifies the validity of the selected instruments.
The p-values of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity are shown in Table 4 . This indicator is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index, normalized to obtain values ranging from 0 to 1 (maximum concentration). Data is obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database. http://unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx 37 We argue that these instruments are strictly exogenous -they are not correlated with any shock affecting financial inclusion-.
38 Calderon and Chong (2001) show that trade openness reduce income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. They also find that export orientation towards primary activities may be associated with higher income inequality. This last finding supports the hypothesis that higher trade concentration reduces the effect of trade openness on income inequality, since countries with higher levels of exports concentration are mainly commodities exporters.
a.3. Results
Based on OLS estimations, columns (2) to (7) of Table 5 include the variable Weak_Law as a control, while columns (8) to (12) include the Log_GDP_per_capita. The shadowed columns (7) and (12) indicate the preferred specifications under the two alternatives.
We focus first on the regressions including Weak_Law as a control. We expected a negative sign for the coefficients of all the explanatory variables in these regressions since the variables are expressed as obstacles to financial inclusion. There are two central results from the preferred specification in column (7). The first is that all the variables considered are significant and the goodness of fit reaches a high value (the adjusted R-squared equals 0.81).
The second is that, in comparison to column (1), the absolute value of the coefficient of the Latin America dummy declines significantly to 8.7 (in absolute terms). This last result, in turn, implies that the obstacles to financial inclusion in the regression can account for more than half of the Latin American financial inclusion gap.
How do the alternative obstacles to financial inclusion help to understand the Latin American financial inclusion gap?
The entire set of regressions (columns (2) to (6) (2) is quite high (the adjusted R-squared equals 0.72).
The variables Overhead_Costs and Inflation_Volatility (incorporated in the regression in columns (3) and (7)) are significant as obstacles explaining the dependent variable, financial inclusion, but play a relatively less important role for understanding the Latin American financial inclusion gap; that is, the coefficient of the Latin America dummy only shows a slight decrease in absolute terms when these variables are incorporated in the regression. In addition, Bank_Concentration, while significant on its own or when interacted with Weak_Law (columns 4 and 5 respectively) cannot explain the Latin American financial inclusion gap since the coefficient of the Latin America dummy increases (in absolute terms) when these variables are introduced. Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Wea k La w
Log of GDP per Capita In contrast, controlling for Income_Inequality (column (6) reduces the absolute value of the dummy coefficient from 12.8 to 9.1 and also has a significant effect in explaining financial inclusion.
Taken together, these findings imply that, while all obstacles considered significantly explain the behavior of financial inclusion in a world-wide cross-country analysis, institutional deficiencies and income inequality are at the core of understanding the low levels of financial inclusion in the Latin American region relative to the region's comparators. To clarify:
Improvements in all and every one of the obstacles analyzed support an increase in the absolute levels of financial inclusion for the countries in the sample: Latin America and otherwise.
However, to attain large reductions in the financial inclusion gap between Latin America as a whole and its comparators, improvements in institutional quality and income inequality are essential.
Before leaving this discussion, it is worth noting that, in line with the hypothesis stated in section 3 regarding the relationship between bank concentration and financial inclusion, we have included an interaction term between Weak_Law and Bank_Concentration in the regression analysis (columns (5) and (7)). We can, therefore, assess whether the quality of institutions affects the extent to which bank concentration undermines financial inclusion. In particular, we evaluate the significance of the parameter 2  in: decreases relative to its initial value in column 1 only in column (12) when the variable inflation volatility is included.
In the preferred specification of this second set of regressions (column (12)) the overall fit of the regression is similar to the regression where Weak_Law was included (column (7)). How to choose between the two alternative specifications? It depends on objectives. If the objective is to obtain the best fit for the dependent variable in a parsimonious way, then the regression in column (12) needs to be the choice. This could explain why a number of empirical papers aiming to explain financial inclusion consistently incorporate real GDP per capita as a control. 39 However, if the objective is to understand the factors behind the low levels of financial inclusion in Latin America relative to the rest of the world, then the specification in column (7) is preferable. Based on our objectives, we favor the specification in column (7).
As a robustness analysis we present in Table V A final result from Table 5 is that, while a large proportion of the gap is explained by our analysis, there remains an unobservable Latin American fixed effect that cannot be accounted for the observable variables included in the regressions.
To further understand the financial inclusion gap and evaluate the effect of additional variables that are only available at the household level, we need to change the data dimension and use an alternative methodology 40 . In the next section we use individual-level data to explore whether demographic characteristics constitute additional obstacles that affect financial inclusion in Latin American countries. The presence of a Latin American specific effect of these demographic obstacles can contribute to further understanding the Latin American financial inclusion gap.
b. Further Insights into the Latin America Financial Inclusion Gap: an individual-level analysis
This section analyzes whether belonging to a Latin American country significantly affects individuals' probability of being financially included; controlling for individual characteristics as well as for the country-level obstacles previously analyzed.
While the number of individual characteristics considered in the literature on financial inclusion is quite large, limitations on data availability restricts our analysis to a few individual-level variables. Specifically, we control for age, sex, education level and income.
This data is obtained from the Global Findex Database 41 .
Our analysis has two parts. First, controlling for the four individual characteristics mentioned above, we explore whether there is a significant negative effect of belonging to a Latin American country on the individual's probability of having an account at a financial institution. In this analysis, we acknowledge that there are other characteristics such as employment, marital status or geographic location of the household (urban/rural), which are shown in the literature to be determinants of financial inclusion (see Allen et al., 2012) 42 . Second, to get further insights into the Latin American financial inclusion gap, we evaluate whether there is a Latin American-specific effect of sex, education level and income, on the individual's probability of having an account at a financial institution.
Using a sample of 92 countries and 96,124 individuals we estimate the following equation as a probit model by maximum likelihood. 41 The complete microdata for the Global Findex is available at http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/global-findex/. However, among individual-level characteristics collected from the survey, only age, sex, education level and income are publicly available. Respondents in the survey are randomly selected adults within the selected household. 42 In the working paper "The Foundations of Financial Inclusion", Allen et al. (2012) do have availability to the whole set of individual characteristics collected from the survey that shaped the Global Findex Database. In their analysis, they show that a number of individual-level characteristics, additionally to those we are including in this paper, are significant in explaining financial inclusion. The results of the probit estimation are presented in Table 6 . In this set of estimations we include the four individual-level characteristics mentioned above and control for the country-level obstacles from the preferred specification in Table 5 (column 7) 45 . Results show that there is a significant negative effect of belonging to a Latin American country on the probability of having an account at a financial institution (see columns (1) to (4)).
Average marginal effects are calculated in Table 7 46 . Column 1 shows that the probability of having an account is on average 11.9 percentage points lower for someone in Latin America than for someone in comparator countries. 43 Specifically, the question stated in the Global Findex survey is the following: Do you, either by yourself or together with someone else, currently have an account at any of the following places? An account can be used to save money, to make or receive payments, or to receive wages and remittances. Do you currently have an account at a bank or credit union (or another financial institution, where applicable -for example, cooperatives in Latin America).http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1162/search?vk=q1a&search=Searc h&vf%5B%5D=name&vf%5B%5D=labl&vf%5B%5D=qstn&vf%5B%5D=catgry. 44 In this case, this latent variable represents subjective elements that might be behind the individual's decision of demanding a bank account or the bank's decision of supplying a bank account. In other words, it represents the unobservable elements behind the supply and demand decisions reflected in the observable variable Bank_Account. 45 When we introduce controls for individual characteristics, the sign and significance of country level obstacles remain the same. However, when we control for age and education, Income_Inequality is no longer significant. We found a high and significant correlation between the gini coefficient and the average values of education and age. Correlations suggest that the more educated and older a country's population is on average, the lower the country's levels of inequality. We conclude, therefore, that age and education are capturing most of the effect of inequality on financial inclusion. 46 In a binary model, the influence of the regressors on the dependent variable does not only depend on their coefficients but also on the values taken by these variables. Thus, the magnitudes of the coefficients in table 6 are not directly interpretable.
We also obtain the expected effects of individual characteristics. That is, there is a positive effect of the respondent's age on his/her probability of having an account at a formal financial institution 47 . Also, being a woman is an obstacle to financial inclusion since it implies having, on average, 3.3 percentage points lower probability of owning a financial account relative to a man. Moreover, relative to the poorest quintile, the probability of having an account increases for individuals in the higher quintiles of the income distribution.
For example, column 1 shows that belonging to the second quintile implies having, on average, 3.5 percentage points higher probability of owning an account than individuals in the poorest quintile. Additionally, belonging to the richest quintile implies having, on average, 16.5 percentage points higher probability than individuals in the poorest quintile.
Having secondary education as the highest level of attained schooling allows, on average, 14.6 percentage points higher probability of owning an account than having attained only primary education. And, by completing tertiary education, an individual increases his probability of having an account by 28.5 percentage points relative to individuals with only primary education.
In order to get further insights into the Latin American financial inclusion gap we evaluate whether there is a region-specific effect of individual characteristics on the probability of being financially included. To test this hypothesis, we include interaction terms between individual characteristics and the dummy for Latin America (see Table 6 columns 2 to 4).
Column 2 shows that the interaction between sex (represented by the dummy variable Female) and the dummy for Latin America is negative and not significant. This implies that the difference in the probability of being financially included between women and men is similar in Latin America than in comparator countries. (See Figure 8) .
Column 3 shows the interaction term between the Latin American dummy and income group. This interaction is positive and significant for the 5 th quintile of the income distribution. This implies that the difference in the probability of being financially included between the poorest individuals (1 st quintile) and the richest individuals (5 th quintile) is significantly higher in Latin America than in comparator countries (see figure 9) .
Finally, column 4 shows that the interaction term between the Latin American dummy and education level is positive and significant only for secondary education. This implies that the 31 difference in the probability of being financially included between the less educated and the ones with secondary education, is significantly higher in Latin America than in comparator countries (see figure 10 ).
The finding that the relative exclusion of the poorest individuals or those with the lowest levels of education is higher in Latin America than in comparator countries helps to provide further insights into the Latin American financial inclusion gap and complements the country-level analysis in the previous section. Future lines of research can be oriented to explore the effects of additional individual characteristics as they become publicly available. Note: Estimated marginal effects from columns 1 to 4 are based on the corresponding regressions in columns 1 to 4 of table 6. ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. The reference category for education variables is completed primary or less. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Since age is computed as a continuous variable, the average marginal effect will provide the instantaneous rate of change. 
Conclusions
This paper built on existing research and new databases to address a fundamental question: At the country level we identified four types of obstacles: socio-economic constraints, macroeconomic vulnerabilities, institutional deficiencies and financial system inefficiencies that impede the adequate provision of financial services. A key finding of the paper is that, although the four types of obstacles explain the absolute level of financial inclusion, the particularly high levels of income inequality and institutional deficiencies in Latin America can be assessed as the most important obstacles explaining the region's financial inclusion gap. These results shed some light on the direction of policies needed to improve the relative position of Latin America.
Analysis at the individual level, where characteristics such as age, sex, education and individual income are included, shows that the probability of being financially included is significantly lower for an individual in Latin America than for someone in comparator Strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to expand access to credit.
Doing Business 2004-2011
Doing Business, credit information index
Credit depth of information index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available through public or private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions.
Heritage Financial Freedom Index
The Index scores an economy's financial freedom by looking into the following five broad areas: The extent of government regulation of financial services, The degree of state intervention in banks and other financial firms through direct and indirect ownership, The extent of financial and capital market development, Government influence on the allocation of credit, and Openness to foreign competition Heritage 1995 Heritage -2012 43
Annex IV: Validity of Instruments in the Endogeneity Analysis
The relevance of the instruments is analyzed through the statistics of the first stage regression in Table IV .I. The R-squared and the adjusted R-squared are around 0.7, which means that there won't be significant loss of precision because of IV estimation. Also, both instruments are significant when explaining Income_Inequality, controlling for the remaining obstacles (excluded instruments). Adjusted R-squared 0.6700 Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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The exclusion restriction is also fulfilled. Table IV .II column 1 shows the OLS estimation of equation (1) controlling simultaneously for Income_Inequality and the corresponding instruments. Under this specification, both instruments are not significant in explaining financial inclusion. However, when removing Income_Inequality, Trade_Openness becomes significant and its interaction term is very close to be significant 48 (see column 2). This exercise supports the argument that the effect of the instruments on financial inclusion is only through their effect on Income_Inequality.
48 Statistically significant at the 18% level. Note: ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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